57. Smith, *Experiencing Musical Sound*, p. 112.
58. Husserl, *Time*, p. 61.
59. Adapted from the diagram given in Husserl, *Time*, pp. 49 and 121.
60. Robert Sokolowski, "Timing," *The Review of Metaphysics* 35 (1982), p. 688.
61. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), p. 186.
62. *Experiencing Musical Sound*, p. 107.

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Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of music

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ALFRED SCHUTZ's phenomenological investigations of musical phenomena are contained in four essays, written over a period of approximately sixteen years. The earliest essay, which remains unpublished, is a rough draft of an investigation of drama and opera written sometime before the Second World War. The second entitled "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music," dates from 1944 and was originally written in English.[1] Both of these essays were utilized in part in Schutz's two well-known essays dealing with music published in *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*.[2] Ideas developed in the earliest essay dealing with drama and opera find expression in the essay "Mozart and the Philosophers" (1956), and "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" contains elements both presupposed and directly paraphrased by Schutz in "Making Music Together" (1951).

I. SCHUTZ'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

It is probably most helpful to begin with a presentation of Schutz's understanding of the phenomenological approach to musical experience, since it determines his entire investigation in a particular manner. Only in "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music," however, does Schutz deal specifically with the problem of the phenomenological approach to musical experience, although some remarks concerning the characteristic features of this approach are made in passing in "Making Music Together."[3]

Schutz's characterization is negative: he approaches that which is

essential to the musical experience phenomenologically considered through a characterization of what is *not* essential. This negative approach, characteristic of the phenomenological method itself, has the function of clearing away the unnecessary and confusing presuppositions which obscure the phenomena to be investigated.[4] With the elimination of theories and presuppositions, which have themselves become the habitual topic of inquiry into musical phenomena of all kinds, the phenomena proper to the phenomenological approach to musical experience emerge.

Schutz lists three phenomena which, although not essential to the phenomenology of musical experience, generally play a determining role in musical investigations. Two of these, mentioned in the following quotation, predominate in music theory and appreciation texts.

> A phenomenological approach to music may safely disregard the physical qualities of the sound as well as the rationalization of these sounds which leads to the musical scale (FPM § 6).

It is not uncommon to find discussions of the physical properties of sound in texts dealing with musical experience. The experience of music is "explained" in terms of sound waves that have as their origin a vibrating material and that ultimately affect the ear of the listener. Thus the experience is explained in terms of a stimulus-response relationship between the sound waves and their physiological effects on the human ear. When we consider the actual experience of music, however, we must agree with Schutz that this explanation is inadequate, that the listener "responds neither to sound waves, nor does he perceive sounds; he just listens to music" (FPM §6). Such an explanation substitutes for an account faithful to the actual experience of listening to music a scheme of interpretation proper to physics and in this way either loses or obscures the original phenomena. Indeed, with the introduction of this scheme of interpretation problems arise which would otherwise not have to be raised. For example, we find ourselves faced with the task of bringing into agreement our experience of music and the scheme of interpretation from the field of physics. Questions arise as to why certain sound waves in combination are perceived as dissonant or consonant, etc.[5]

Similarly, works on music theory usually devote a good deal of space to discussing what Schutz terms the "mathematical foundation of music." The experience of the listener, however, is not an experience of the mathematical proportions which hold between notes of different pitch.

> Interesting and even miraculous as this relationship is when compared to other points of view, it has little to do with the experiencing of music . . . (FPM §6).

This mathematical relationship, as Schutz indicates, does not even help to solve the problem of consonance and dissonance. A theory of pure intervals and simple proportions does not explain the phenomenon of dissonance for the Western musical tradition, let alone musical scales and "tastes" of other cultures. Schutz suggests that the meaning of these "historical categories of the aesthetics of music" should rather be sought in the context of the relevant "prevailing ideal of perfection" which would necessarily be an element in the listener's stock of knowledge.

Finally, Schutz claims that the phenomenologist may disregard the various means and methods used in the actual performance, or reproduction of a performance, of a musical work. This claim is a direct consequence of Schutz's understanding of the mode of existence peculiar to a musical work—a topic which we shall deal with shortly. As a result of this third claim Schutz has further characterized the phenomenological approach to musical experience as one which does not have to concern itself with musical instruments (including the human voice) or the various forms of reproducing or recording music. Of course, Schutz does not claim that the various means used in transmitting music are wholly irrelevant to musical experience.[6] It makes a great deal of difference, for example, as to whether a musical work is played well, sung badly, simply imagined or remembered, etc. Schutz's claim is that,

> . . . all of these are merely means for the production, the reproduction and conservation of the work of music, and they have only a mediate impact on the experience of the listener as well as of the composer (FPM §6).

As a *means* of communicating a work of music, they are to be distinguished from the work of music itself, i.e., the communicated

musical content. This distinction underlies Schutz's third assertion about the phenomenological approach to musical experience.

Schutz plainly disregards those elements of the total experience of a musical work which vary from performance to performance, from one kind of instrument or recording technique to another. In other words, he disregards variable or accidental elements, focusing on what is invariant and essential in musical experience. What Schutz calls his "eidetic method" is an approach which goes beyond mere description although, in principle, it remains faithful to the phenomena of immediate musical experience. Thus, in the present context the phenomena with which the phenomenological approach concerns itself are

1) the essential structure of the experience of the listener *reflectively* grasped and

2) the "content" of the musical work considered as the intentional correlate of musical consciousness with its peculiar mode of existence.

Indeed, this peculiar mode of existence is central for Schutz's account of the experience of music.[7]

II. THE WORK OF MUSIC AS AN IDEAL OBJECT

Central to Schutz's phenomenology of the musical experience is his conception of the ideal nature of the work of art in general and the musical work in particular. However, this key concept remains a merely implicit element in his published essay "Making Music Together," and the ideal status of the musical work is merely asserted, not examined, in the earlier "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music." We must nonetheless attempt to define the ideal nature of the work of music since it is crucial for all of Schutz's further distinctions with respect to the experience of the work of music, e.g., the distinction between polythetic and monothetic constitution.

In Section 8 of "Fragments" Schutz asserts that a work of music has the "character of an ideal object," and in Section 9 he investigates the peculiar nature of this ideal status. He begins by making a sharp distinction between

1) the work of music as an ideal object, i.e., the musical meaning, and

2) the score or performance, etc., which as "real objects" are the means of communication to which the ideal object or meaning is bound.

> To be sure, the score, the performance, the book, the lecture, are indispensible means for communicating the musical or scientific thought. They are not, however, this thought itself. A work of music or a mathematical theorem has the character of an ideal object. The communicability of a work of music of a mathematical theorem is bound to real objects—visible or audible objects—but the musical or scientific thought itself exists independently of all these means of communication (FPM §8; also MMT 164f.).[8]

When Schutz refers to the "ideal" nature of a work of music he is not speaking about its ontological status as anything like a Platonic Idea (CP I 110). Among ideal objects he includes "the concept of number . . . or the content of the Pythagorean theorem as a meaningful entity; or the meaning of a sentence or a book . . ." (CP I 110). An ideal object for Schutz is an intentional object or constituted meaning of the intended objects of our experience.

Furthermore,

> It is the peculiarity of intentional objects that they are *founded* upon so-called "real" objects of the outer world, and that they can be communicated only by signs and symbols which are in turn perceptible things, such as sound waves of the spoken word, or printed letters (CP I 110).[9]

Schutz, following Husserl, here emphasizes the essential difference between the enduring and self-same *constituted meaning* of the musical work and the plurality of more or less contingent *means* of communicating it. Schutz's phenomenological analyses are concerned with the constituted meaning and not the means by which it is communicated.

Also, ideal objects are "founded" upon the various means by which they are communicated (whether merely imagined or actual), but are not to be identified with them. For example, with respect to

the act of grasping the ideal object as a constituted meaning, space and time as we ordinarily think of them are unimportant (MMT 164).

> If Beethoven filled his notebooks with sketches for his compositions, he did so for his own convenience. The themes noted down did not enter into existence by his writing them down; they existed in his mind long before (FPM §8).

On the other hand, space and time are important for the *communication* of ideal objects and thus for the real objects upon which they are founded.

Schutz makes two further distinctions concerning ideal objects:

1) A work of music is characterized by a form of constitution peculiar to itself, which serves to distinguish it from other—e.g., mathematical—ideal objects. The Pythagorean theorem as an ideal object is constituted in a series of related acts of deductive inference, in a process which Husserl termed "polythetic constitution."[10] Once constituted, its meaning is available to be grasped immediately, as a whole, as the "proposition and its meaning," without reference to the multitude of single steps in which the meaning was first constituted. Thus, the meaning of ideal objects with a conceptual content of which "originally we can be aware . . . only synthetically,"[11] becomes available to a "monothetic" grasping, i.e., immediately and without rehearsing the "polythetic" acts in which the ideal object (meaning) was first constituted.

The work of music as an ideal object, however, cannot be grasped monothetically. "In one single ray we cannot grasp the constituted meaning of a work of music" (FPM §9). Of course, we can grasp the mood evoked or suggested by the program notes, or the content in terms of a definition of the musical form, e.g., sonata form, passacaglia, theme and variations.[12] But this "content" should not be confused with the polythetically constituted meaning, i.e., the work of music itself, which

> . . . can only be recollected and grasped by reconstituting the polythetic steps in which it has been built up, by reproducing mentally or actually its development from the first to the last bar as it goes on in time (FPM §9).

Unlike the constitution of the Pythagorean theorem, the original

polythetic constitution of the work of music does not result in the constitution of a conceptual meaning content which is available to be grasped monothetically. The meaning of the work of music is intimately connected to the very process of its polythetic constitution from which it cannot be abstracted.[13]

2) Schutz makes a final distinction among those ideal objects which are properly speaking "ideal singularities" (*eidetische Singularitäten*).[14] This distinction is made in Section 10 of "Fragments," and is briefly suggested in a footnote to "Making Music Together" (MMT 173n). Both a poem and a musical work must be reconstituted in a polythetic manner, and in both instances the meaning properly exists in such an act of reconstitution. The difference is that as an ideal object the poem may have a conceptual content, i.e., a content which admits of being grasped monothetically. This conceptual content, however, must not be confused with the poetical "meaning" of the ideal object. I can discuss and theorize about the content of a poem by Hölderlin, but insofar as I respect the poem as a poem, I can never substitute any conceptual content for the essentially polythetically constituted meaning of the poem.[15] The work of music as an ideal object, however, is "not related to a conceptual scheme" (MMT 173) and cannot be grasped monothetically. It must always be grasped as a unique individual, as *this* work of music, with reference to its (actual or imagined) re-creation in the series of polythetic acts which constituted its unique meaning.

III. MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AS A FINITE PROVINCE OF MEANING

In order to be able to study the experience of music we must first examine and bring to light those features which characterize this experience and thus distinguish it from other experiences. We must first ask what it is that makes the experience of music different? What is the source of the difference?

With these questions the scope of investigation must broaden to include Schutz's philosophical inquiry beyond the narrower confines of the experience of music. To be sure, Schutz's investiga-

tions of the experience of music were subordinate to his primary philosophical interest in the structure and constitution of the world which is taken for granted by all of us in our daily life together in the world. Within this larger framework, some of the insights into features of musical experience merely indicated in the essays on music are more fully elaborated.[16]

In Sections 15 and 16 of "Fragments" Schutz presents an extremely condensed summary of some of those features characteristic of the musical experience—a presentation which presumably would have been considerably expanded had Schutz completed the essay. For our purposes, I would like to develop Schutz's suggestions by placing this essay on music (1944) in the larger context of Schutz's thought as formulated in the essay "On Multiple Realities" (1945).[17] We should thus be able to answer our questions concerning the features which characterize the experience of music.

According to Schutz, the experience of music assumes a peculiar and characteristic attitude. He says:

> . . . we find that the decision to listen to pure music involves a peculiar attitude on the part of the listener. He stops living in his acts of daily life, stops being directed towards their objects. His attention toward life has been diverted from its original realm; in Bergson's terminology, his tension of consciousness has changed. He lives now on another plane of consciousness (FPM §15).

This passage, which points to the fact that the experience of music is made possible through the adoption of a particular attitude, brings to our attention several important questions, whose answers will enable us to determine what it is that makes the experience of music unique. We must ask how our attention to the original realm to which Schutz refers differs from our attention to the work of music? What is the nature of the transition to the attitude peculiar to the experience of music? How is the transition achieved?

The adoption of the attitude peculiar to the experience of music is first made possible by a suspension of those eminently practical concerns and interests which characterize the "paramount reality" of daily life. Schutz here utilizes the Husserlian concept of "epoché" although admittedly in a manner different from Husserl. Schutz, unlike Husserl, here understands the epoché not as a device or *methodological procedure* to be consciously and systematically employed

in order to give access to the field of investigation proper to phenomenological analysis, i.e., consciousness and its correlates, although for Schutz too it serves to de-limit what is and is not thematic.[18] It is, rather, the experience of turning our attention away from the everyday world and its practical concerns; of changing the focus of attention by overlooking elements that were previously thematic and the center of our concern. Following Kierkegaard, Schutz applies the term "leap" or "shock" to the transitional experience which leads to the experience of music. We will find that what is thematic in the new experience differs radically from what was previously thematic and that the transition is achieved by means of an experience of reorientation.

How is such a subjective experience of reorientation achieved? The transition is accomplished by means of a suspension of concerns not pertinent to musical experience, but which may have predominated beforehand, e.g., theoretical concerns may have dominated for the scientist at work as practical concerns may have dominated for the person engaged in earning a living. From the examples which Schutz offers it seems that the transition can occur either passively and quite unintentionally, or actively as the result of a decision. To elucidate the two possible ways in which this transformation can be achieved we may compare the "shock of falling asleep as the leap into the world of dreams" with the "radical change in our attitude if [standing] before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited by what is within the frame" (CP I 231). The experience of falling asleep and the corresponding transition to the world of dreams is an instance of what I have termed a "passive" transition. Of course we can certainly make a resolve to go to sleep, but it is always possible (except in the case of insomnia) for us to quite simply fall into the state of sleep with no previous intention of doing so, e.g., while reading. We quite naturally make the transition to the world of dreams without any special effort or awareness of transition. Quite different, however, is our experience in a gallery in which we have come to see works of visual art. Here we have an example of a transition which is actively effected. We radically change the focus of our attention and we do so voluntarily and actively. Schutz mentions the function which the picture's frame plays in this transition; how-

ever, it is also true that the museum or gallery is itself a sort of "frame" which functions to change the focus of our attention. Upon entering the gallery the "tension" of our consciousness changes. We voluntarily lay aside the concerns and attitudes which are operative within the everyday world. The gallery itself, announces the fact that here something different is required of us. Within what may be a quite ordinary building, we find ourselves adopting an out-of-the-ordinary attitude. We no longer concern ourselves with problems which might ordinarily be the focus of our attention, e.g., the housewife does not worry as to whether the gallery is dusted and cleaned, we do not think of the building as we think of the building where we live or work. What is now thematic is the visual experience of the paintings which are displayed in the gallery. We do things which indicate the shifted focus of our attention. We speak in hushed voices and stand before the pictures concentrating upon that which is visually offered. The focus of our attention is circumscribed by the frame of the painting (when there is a frame), which quite literally separates what is pertinent from what is not, and focuses our attention upon the visual forms within its boundaries.

We could also show the distinction between the passively and actively accomplished transitions or experiences of "shock" within the realm of musical experience. As Schutz points out, "when the conductor raises his baton, the audience has performed a leap, in the sense of Kierkegaard, from one level of consciousness to another" (FPM §15). Here the transition is actively and voluntarily carried out. However, the transition can also be involuntarily achieved as when music suddenly "catches" my attention. I might, for example, be sitting at my writing table working on an essay, when I suddenly become aware of, and am absorbed by, the music playing on the radio. The focus of my attention is no longer directed upon my essay and the problems with which it dealt. I am now completely absorbed by the music; this fact indicates that the transition has been effected.

In all of these examples, we have spoken of a transition from one realm of experience to another. It is now time to investigate their nature and the ways in which they differ from one another. Schutz, reinterpreting William James's concept of "sub-universes" of reality in phenomenological terms, designates these realms as "finite provinces of meaning" (CP I 229ff.).[19] Each finite province of meaning depends upon and is characterized by a peculiar "cognitive style" with respect to which it is internally consistent. To the cognitive style characteristic of each province of meaning belongs

> . . . a specific tensions of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific *epoché*, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective (CP I 232).

Schutz investigates the nature of several finite provinces of meaning, the modification of the meaning in passing from one province to another, and their corresponding cognitive styles in his essay "On Multiple Realities."

Once the transition to the new level of consciousness, with its peculiar tension characteristic of the musical experience, has been accomplished an entirely new experiential complex is brought into operation. At this level of consciousness

> [the members of the audience] are no longer engaged in the dimension of space and spatial time, they are no longer involved in the maze of activities necessary to deal with men and things. They accept the guidance of music in order to relax their tension and to surrender to its flux, a flux which is that of their stream of consciousness in inner time (FPM §15).

According to Schutz, the province of musical meaning is constituted, like every other, by the change in our tension of consciousness, which in turn results from directing our attention away from the world of everyday life which is the archetype for all of our experience (CP I 233). The field of consciousness is no longer geared for action, i.e., we do not feel compelled or called upon actively to change the world by our working actions. For example, when we attend a performance of *Hamlet,* we have come to see and hear what takes place on the stage. We must leave behind our everyday concerns and with the dimming of the houselights (a further indication of the fact that the "accent of reality" has been transferred to the now lighted stage and the action taking place there) and the beginning of the dramatic work, we make the "leap" to a new tension of consciousness appropriate to the finite province of meaning of the drama. It should be noticed that we experience time and space quite differently within this new province of meaning. We witness action unfolding on

the stage within a space and time which, although representing the space and time in which our actions in the everyday world take place, is distinctly different.[20] The time and space of the action of the actors on the stage is an "imaginary" (Bergson) time and space, i.e., one in which we do not actively participate, but rather live imaginatively. Furthermore, as I become progressively involved as a spectator in the unfolding of the course of events of the drama, the actors "are" Hamlet, his mother, etc. I watch as the drama of their lives unfolds upon the stage. As a member of the audience, I am called upon to observe simply what *appears* before me, i.e., to be a "spectator."

It would be completely out of keeping with the dramatic province of meaning to suddenly transgress its boundaries and attempt to actively intercede on Hamlet's behalf. Within the province of meaning of the experience of the dramatic work we are called upon as members of the audience to be spectators, who as such, bestow upon the dramatic work its "accent of reality." Within this province of meaning our working actions (active intercession) are inconsistent with the set of experiences characteristic of this province. The disruption of the dramatic reality which would occur if a member of the audience ran onto the stage to warn Hamlet of a plot against his life brings to our attention the fundamental *inconsistency* of the world of everyday life, in which such an action would be interpreted as a laudable deed, and the imaginary world of drama, in which such an action is out of place and totally inconsistent with the province of meaning of the dramatic work. Active involvement would be interpreted as absurd by the other members of the audience who live within the finite province of the drama, in which such active participation is foreign.[21]

Returning, however, to the musical province of meaning, we further observe that the music itself directs us to accomplish the transition from the province of meaning of everyday life to that of music. The listener makes the transition by giving himself over to the musical flux with its corresponding temporal experience. It is the nature of this experience of temporality and the relation of this temporal experience to the musical theme and communication which occupies Schutz's attention to the remaining sections of

"Fragments" and in "Making Music Together." We shall consider these topics after one final observation concerning the province of musical meaning.

Schutz declares that the phenomenological analysis of the work of music must disregard, for the moment, the peculiarities of a given musical culture in its attempt to discover

> . . . certain features which are essential for the experience of music as a phenomenon of our conscious life (FPM §16).

This, however, does not mean that a phenomenological analysis is to disregard the *role* which the musical culture plays as a "frame of reference" for the actual experience of a musical work. A phenomenological analysis would deal with musical culture with respect to its essential function (FPM §17).

The existence of this frame of reference provides us with another aspect of the musical experience which differs from that of everyday experiences, thereby serving to further distinguish this experience as unique. Although Schutz only hints at this distinction, we may elaborate somewhat in the direction he indicated with the aid of related material contained in the book *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, the manuscript of which was begun three years after that on the phenomenology of music.[22] What Schutz terms the "stock of knowledge at hand" in the manuscript on relevance is what he is referring to as the "frame of reference" and "previous knowledge" in "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music."

In both instances, the sedimentation of previous experiences constitutes what Schutz calls our "habitual knowledge" (RPR 66), i.e., knowledge which remains unactivated and on the margins or "horizon" of our field of consciousness until needed in the course of further experiences. The activation or bringing into play of particular elements of this frame of reference is to be understood in terms of "systems of relevances." The elaboration of the specifics of these systems is beyond the scope of this investigation; however, the direction of Schutz's thought is important for our purposes. Schutz summarizes as follows:

> . . . we have found that what we call our stock of knowledge at hand is the

sedimentation of various previous activities of our mind, and these are guided by systems of prevailing actually operative relevances of different kinds. These activities lead to the acquisition of habitual knowledge which is dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated. Motivational relevances lead to the constitution of the "interest" situation, which in turn determines the system of topical relevances. The latter bring material which was horizonal or marginal into the thematic field, thus determining the problems for thought and action for further investigation, selected from the background which is, ultimately, the world which is beyond question and taken for granted. These topical relevances also determine the level or limits for such investigation required for producing knowledge and familiarity sufficient for the problem at hand. Thus, the system of interpretational relevances becomes established, and this leads to the determination of the typicality structure of our knowledge (RPR 66).

Taking this into account, we can begin to see the extent to which Schutz's ideas concerning the function of the musical culture in his essays on music exceeded the scope of a straightforward history of music. By shifting the focus of investigation, by ignoring certain traditionally standard problems of music theory, Schutz was able to expand and deepen our understanding of music and musical experience. Schutz suggests that we disregard the peculiarities of particular instances of frames of reference which have been operative at various times and in various musical cultures, although the importance of such an historical investigation for an adequate understanding of particular works of music is not denied. What Schutz rightly emphasizes is the importance of recognizing, first, that there necessarily exists such a frame of reference within the context of *any* meaningful experience of music, and second, that this frame of reference must be investigated with respect to its structure, constitution, and function within our experience of music. In the absence of this sort of prior recognition, the history of music can become a formless and trivial collection of biographies and anecdotes, in which, although the presence of these frames of reference may be discerned, their function and structure remains unrecognized or obscure.

We have already discussed some of the ways in which music as a province of meaning is differentiated from other provinces of meaning as well as from that of daily life. A further difference can be discovered in the systems of relevance peculiar to each province of meaning. When we make the transition from one finite province of

meaning to another, there is a corresponding shift in the prevailing systems of relevance.

While living in any of these worlds (on which we then bestow the "accent of reality"), we live in the various systems of relevances peculiar to it. There are, that is, topical, motivational and interpretational relevances pertaining to the world of dreams, of play, of theory, and so on. If we "leap" from one to another, we leave behind all the systems of relevances operative merely within its limits (RPR 105).

Schutz gives an indication of the function played by such shifting systems of relevances in Section 17 of "Fragments." As the music begins and the listener's attention is shifted to the province of meaning peculiar to the musical process, a system of relevances is activated in which that which is typically relevant to the musical topic at hand is brought into play. The listener refers what he is now experiencing to a stock of previously acquired knowledge which is relevant for giving meaning to the present experiences. As he listens to the music unfold he brings pertinent material from the horizons of his conscious life into the now thematic musical kernel.[23] He is thus led to refer the present experience to his knowledge of a relevant type or style which will give meaning to this particular experience. These "interpretational relevances" enable the listener to make sense of the sounds that he hears.[24] But what Schutz calls "typicality" also refers to the ability to anticipate that which will follow (RPR 58). The listener anticipates that the next movement of the sonata to which he is listening will be a slow movement on the basis of his acquaintance with the sonata form of this period, with the composer's typical arrangement of his sonatas, or, perhaps, even from his previous experience of listening to this sonata itself. In each of these instances the anticipations are to a greater or lesser degree empty.

Although we cannot describe in greater detail the interplay of the three systems of relevances, the establishment of the topically relevant theme and the various ways in which the motivational relevances (both the "in-order-to" and the "because" motives) are brought into play, we have at least indicated that each province of meaning has its own system of relevances. In the province of musical meaning the thematic musical kernel determines what will be relevant to its interpretation. The experience of this particular piece of music prompts the bringing into play of relevant material in previous

experience and this is determined by our "actual interest" which in turn is a function of our present situation (RPR 44). We do not refer our present experience of a work of music to our knowledge of finances or of grammatical rules. In fact, according to Schutz, none of our spatial experiences is relevant for the interpretation of music. Thus, with his concept of systems of relevances and the relevant stock of knowledge at hand, Schutz distinguishes the musical experience from other experiences and brings to our attention another feature of musical experience.

IV. ELEMENTS OF THE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

In Section 18 of "Fragments" Schutz lists three elements essential to musical experience.

1) Musical experience, according to Schutz, "originates in the flux of inner time" and does not, of necessity, refer to the spatiotemporal dimension. Musical meaning emerges from our experiencing of the unfolding of the musical events in the inner time of our conscious life. Musical experience, however, can refer—as in the case of dance music—to actions in the outer world, and this is possible, according to Schutz, because the composer utilizes his musical elements in such a way as to suggest movement and thus to coordinate the "events within the spatiotemporal dimension with those within the inner time" (FPM §18; also CP I 218).[25]

2) Because the musical experience "shares the flux of the stream of consciousness in simultaneity," the meaning of this experience is based upon the way in which meaning is constituted—through "retention" and "reproduction," "protention" and "anticipation"— in our stream of consciousness. If "only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are . . . subjectively meaningful" (CP I 210), then musical meaning emerges from the flux of its unfolding in the stream of consciousness by means of a structure which utilizes our ability to recall and anticipate our experiences.

3) Finally, within the flux of inner time, the musical theme emerges as what Schutz calls "a unique configuration." The theme, which is the "basic element of all music," is "experienced as a whole."

The term "theme" as used here should not be understood in a narrow or technical sense. Although Schutz employs a melodic example, characteristic of Western musical culture, when discussing the musical theme as a sequence of tones in Section 19 of "Fragments," it must be realized that this is only *one* example. It can be gathered from Schutz's characterization that the term "theme" refers to a structure or configuration which recurs and is identifiable, admits of being combined with other themes, and can undergo modification and be recognized "as the same but modified" by the listener. Thus understood, i.e., as structure, a theme can be formed by a series of rhythmic beats on a drum as well as by a sequence of tones.

A theme in this broad sense is a structure through which the experience of music in inner time is articulated, in a particular manner, as is evidenced by the fact that Schutz does not include rhythmical structuralization among the elements common to ali musical experience. If our interpretation of the theme as structure is correct, then Schutz is correct in rejecting rhythmic structuring as an additional element common to all musical experience. Rhythmic structure would represent merely a particular instance of structure in general, which is a necessary element of all musical experience.[26]

V. MUSIC AND SPACE

In Section 13 of "Fragments" Schutz explores a characteristic peculiarity of musical experience not explored in either of the two essays which appeared in *Collected Papers II*, viz., the relationship between musical experience and the experience of space. The peculiar nature of this relationship serves to further characterize the musical experience and to distinguish it from experiences of other art forms.

Our experience of space is determined by the interplay of our various kinaesthetic functions, by means of which the spatial field is built up as a continuum of perspectives, all of which refer to the "kernel of optimal accessibility . . . the sphere of nearness with my own body in the center" (FPM §13). Within this sphere of optimal accessibility I am free to manipulate and tactually experience objects with respect to haptic kinaesthesias, and I can visually observe this field with "optimal *sharpness*" with respect to optic kinaesthesias. It is also possible within this sphere to re-experience and thus corroborate previous experiences. For example, upon re-opening my eyes I perceive the same desk and writing materials that I had perceived before I closed my eyes.

The remote spatial field, on the other hand, is experienced as a possible field of action whose objects I may approach, or one whose objects may enter my manipulatory sphere through movements of their own. It is the spatial realm interpreted on the basis of previous experience within the immediate manipulatory sphere as being the same or similar.

> Thus, the constitution of space refers back to our kinaesthetic experiences of our bodily organs of sight and touch and our actual or virtual ability to perform the kinaesthesia of locomotion (FPM §13).

The art of painting, an art employing as a medium spatial elements, must take these ways in which space is experienced into account. The eye of the beholder is first focused upon a specific visual field by means of an experience of encounter with the edges or margins of the painted field (whether or not these boundaries are accentuated by an actual frame).[27] With this narrowing of the visual field to the painted surface, the painted objects and their arrangement become thematic and the eye is incited to investigate the painted space, thereby organizing it in a manner determined to a large degree by the artist's arrangement of it, e.g., by means of perspective, color, line. An illustrative example of the manner in which a painter can organize the painted space, utilizing only coexistent and immovable images, and yet, guide the oculomotoric movement of the beholder to organize this field for himself in a predetermined manner is found in the portraits of Velásquez.

Normally, of course, the arrangement of the perceptual field is not made thematic. Velásquez, however, made this straightforward visual experience thematic by capturing it and presenting it in his paintings. When we look at a given object before us, we focus upon it in such a way that it is optimally clear and distinct. However, the horizons of this focal area includes many other objects which together form the visual field. These objects are included but are only indistinctly presented, since they are literally not the focus of attention. The margins of the visual field and their corresponding objects blur into one another, are "fuzzy" and only indistinctly perceivable. Velásquez' paintings dictate that a single perspective be assumed by the beholder, by utilizing the very manner in which our visual field is organized to make us adopt a particular perspective.[28] In his portraits, whether of one person or of a group of people, Velásquez painted everything with reference to a single focal point. Everything lying outside of this focal point is presented in varying degrees of indistinctness. In a full-length portrait in which the focal point is the facial area, for example, the rest of the body as well as other objects in the visual field are also present. But if we turn our attention from the focal point to some other area of the painted space we discover a degree of indistinctness which is not characteristic of our experience of the visual field of optimal sharpness. Despite all efforts, the beholder is not able to bring this painted space into focus, and this incompleteness (this "not quite") incites his gaze to move within the painted space in search of visual completion. The art of Velásquez lay in capturing on canvas a single act of perception with its focal point and horizons of indistinctness. He was both able to present the way in which we normally see things and to make use of the way in which we see things to make us see what he intended us to see.

Painting is not the only art form employing spatial elements. Architecture and sculpture are also discussed by Schutz as art forms which necessarily refer back to those kinaesthetic activities in which our experience of space is first constituted. Two features of the experience of the arts using spatial elements should be mentioned. First, in each of these arts, by performing certain kinaesthetic acts, we are able to re-experience a given spatial element as the "same"

element previously experienced. To be sure, although each art form utilizes spatial elements in a different manner to induce the beholder to perform and re-perform various visual, tactile and locomotive kinaesthesias, the experienced effect is the same. The coexistent spatial elements are experienced in a succession of departures and returns to the same elements, thereby creating the impression of a rhythmic recurrence and even of movement. This is possible, according to Schutz, because the kinaesthesias which constitute the spatial field are experienced in the flux of inner time (FPM §13). The impression of movement results from the fact that the polythetic acts in which the spatial field is first constituted are experienced successively in inner time. Secondly, Schutz notes that the spatial field allows of being monothetically grasped, and that this mode of recognition is fundamental for the spatial experience of sameness. The experience of the arts employing coexistent spatial elements is characterized by the possibility of monothetic recognition of sameness. Although the elements may be experienced successively, thereby creating the impression of movement, in fact spatial elements endure and are always available through the re-performance of various kinaesthesias, in which no new process of constitution is required. The coexistent spatial elements remain available to be grasped as a whole in subsequent phases of experience.

Upon examining musical experience, however, Schutz finds a completely different set of experiential features.

> In all the cases considered so far, we found that the experiences of the observer referred to his possible kinaesthesias, the visual, the tactile, the locomotive ones. Yet, the organ by which we experience music, the ear, does not have any kinaesthesia. There is no center of nearness and no horizon in the acoustical field, nor is there a structurization analogous to that of perspective. . . . Thus, the ear is not able to build up the dimension of space (FPM §13).

The apparent absence of spatial structure[29] in the acoustical field is not mitigated, according to Schutz, by the fact that the ear does provide a certain orientation as to the source of a perceived sound or by the fact that the increase and decrease in the volume of a given sound can indicate spatial distance. These acoustical properties do not alone give rise to the experience of "distance," by rely upon "preconstituted spatial experiences which were not purely auditive

ones" (FPM §13). Furthermore, the ear has no means for withdrawing temporarily from the acoustical field, in order to return at a later point in time. The ear is always available to acoustic impressions. Thus recurrence, by means of the re-performance of kinaesthetic activities, fundamental for the experience of sameness in the arts utilizing spatial elements, plays no role in purely acoustical experiences. Schutz concludes, therefore, that the experience of rhythm and pattern in music is independent of spatial experience and that music must necessarily employ a different means to achieve the experience of rhythm, sameness, and pattern.

VI. MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AND THE TEMPORAL ELEMENT

The difficult question of the temporal element in musical experience must now be considered, a discussion central to both "Fragments" and "Making Music Together." In the latter essay Schutz defines music as "a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time" (MMT 170), and goes on to contrast the "inner time" of the work of music with the "outer time" characteristic of the means of communicating music in an attempt to clarify his claim that the work of music—the ideal object—pertains exclusively to the realm of inner time. The contrast between the work of music as an ideal object and the means of its communication, between the ideal object and the "real" object upon which it is "founded," is continued in the present context in terms of a contrast between inner and outer time.

I would suggest that Schutz's entire discussion of temporality is understandable only if we understand what Schutz means when he speaks about music, i.e., when we recall once again what the phenomenological approach deals with. In Section I we concluded that the phenomenology of music deals with music *as it appears* to musical consciousness, i.e., as an intentional correlate. In Section II, when the ideal nature of musical meaning was discussed, it was said that space and time as ordinarily thought of are not involved when it comes to grasping an ideal object. Schutz's use of the term "music" must be understood within this framework.

Furthermore, it should be recalled that aesthetic consciousness

has as its correlate an entire province of meaning, i.e., the world of art, within which the province (sub-province) of musical meaning finds its place. The world of art contains many different art forms, and Schutz, as we have seen in the last section, has attempted to describe some of the peculiarities of music, which he maintains is essentially temporal, over against those arts utilizing spatial elements. In the present context the important point is that each province of meaning, including that of music, has "a specific time perspective" (CP I 232) and it is the time peculiar to the musical province of meaning and musical experience that Schutz proposes to study in his essays on music.

The time of music, considered as it appears to musical consciousness, is "inner time." Schutz characterizes inner time in agreement with the distinction drawn by Husserl between the unchanging and divisible outer experience and the indivisible, permanent flux of inner experience.[30] Inner time, the time of lived experience, is completely free from spatial elements.

> The time of our waiting, the time within which we grow old, the inner time of our stream of consciousness, is entirely free from elements of space (FPM §14).

Inner time is "lived through," and thus cannot be either divided or measured. Thus, the listener lives "while listening, in another dimension of time which cannot be measured by our clocks or other mechanical devices" (FPM §14; also MMT 171).

For example, although the clock upon the wall may measure the passage of a similar amount of time in the case in which we wait anxiously to receive the outcome of major surgery upon someone we love and in the case where we eagerly discuss an issue of vital interest with a friend, we do not *experience* these time intervals as equivalent. In the first example, we say that the time "dragged on" and in the second that the time "flew by." There is no way in which the time which we experience can be measured: it is simply lived through.

In order to be shared or communicated, however, our experience of time must find some expression in the outer world, i.e., it must be founded. This occurs when we "project into space" (FPM §14) our experience in inner time. Inner experience thus comes to be coordinated with events in the world. Through such coordination inner

time becomes available for measurement in terms of motion which traverses spatial intervals. This "projected" time is the "outer time" which Schutz speaks of as the "dimension in which our actions take place, the dimension which we share with our fellowmen" (FPM §14). This outer time is available for further abstraction and can be transformed into the "time of the physicists." The apparent continuity of the process of abstraction, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental difference between inner time and its "projected" counterparts.

Thus far inner time has only been negatively characterized in terms of how it differs from outer time. Schutz's positive characterization of inner time is heavily dependent upon the accounts of Husserl and Bergson as well as upon that of William James. He alternately refers to inner time as "immanent time," as the "durée," and as the "stream of consciousness." From James, Schutz takes an emphasis upon the flow of conscious life and the concept of the "spacious present" in James's interpretation. From Bergson, he adopts the concepts of

1) a durée free from spatial elements and
2) the "tensions" of conscious life.

From Husserl, Schutz takes the detailed and careful structural analyses of the stream of conscious life in order to show how this flux is integrated into an unbroken stream of experience.

According to Schutz, we experience our inner life as unbroken, a flow of interrelated experiences. The "Now" or present is characterized as the time of our immediate experiences. The past, however, is also available to us in the form of completed experiences, in which we no longer immediately "live" but which can become the objects of the reflective mode of experience which we call "memory." "It is this faculty of memory which makes the stream of our consciousness an unbroken and interrelated sequel of our thoughts in inner time" (FPM §14).

Past, completed experiences do not disappear entirely, they are included in present experience through the performance of acts of recollection. The recollection of a past Now, however, does not restore the past to its former state of being present. The recollected past is modified by the perspective of each succeeding Now in which

it is incorporated as the object of the present act of recollection. No further activity is possible with respect to the past, i.e., we cannot "live in" the past as we do in our present experiences or acts. Thus, the past cannot be altered. It is now only a possible object to which present experience can reflectively direct itself in different ways.

The changing flux of conscious life and the difference between the past and the present are also evidence that there is a definite structure to consciousness. Because of this structure it makes a difference whether the object of our thoughts is presently experienced, experienced as recollected or experienced as previously recollected. In each act the same object, "but the same object as modified" (FPM §14), is either immediately experienced or re-experienced. Modifications also originate in continually different relevances operative within each actual Now. New structures of relevance, bring to the foreground new features of the past.[31]

Schutz distinguishes between two types of memory. First, there is the interrelation of present experience with the experience which immediately proceeded it. "Although it sinks into the past, the actual experience is still retained, and, therefore, the term *retention* has been used for this special type of remembrance" (FPM §14). Retention is especially important for music because it helps to explain how a sustained note can be experienced without interruption as an object included in successive Nows. In each succeeding Now there is both the present experience of the sustained tone and the co-present retention of the immediately past experience of this same tone. A second form of recollection, called "*reproduction*" refers to pasts not immediately contiguous with present experience, i.e., it refers to the more remote past. Both retention and reproduction are crucial for the experience of a musical work as a meaningful sequence of tones as we shall see.

Inner experience reveals another dimension of inner time equally important for musical experience; namely, its future-orientation. The future is the ever-present element of expectation that accompanies all of our present experience.

By living in our experience, by being directed towards the objects of our acts and thoughts we are always oriented towards the future, we are always expecting certain occurrences and events (FPM §14).

Thus, the future is to be understood as an element of expectation and open-endedness which accompanies all on-going experiences. It is an empty field of expectation, but it, too, has a structure. That which we expect, is dependent upon the "types" of relevant occurrences from our past and upon the assumption that such types will continue to prevail in the future. That we have no guarantee for this assumption indicates that the future is indeed the empty (merely possible) field of expectations. Past objects of present experience, on the other hand, are not "empty"—"they were what they were" (FPM §14). The past is characterized by its definiteness; and, although I may inadequately or wrongly recall the past, these completed experiences are as past "definite and definitive."

Corresponding to the two forms of memory are two forms of expectation: *protention* and *anticipation*. Protentions are expectations of the immediate future, and are contrasted with what Schutz calls "anticipations," which are of the more distant future. As Schutz indicates, the expected course of those events which are objects of protentions are more likely to be fulfilled than those which are objects of our anticipations. A higher degree of indeterminateness is associated with the remoter future.

The forms of memory and expectation, thus play a decisive role in interrelating the various forms of our experiences into the unbroken flux of conscious life.

Schutz concludes his discussion of the temporal element in music with a consideration of the present. The continuity of the flow of our inner experience of time, as opposed to spatialized time, whose passage is measured as distance traversed between certain points in space, shows that the notion of the durationless present is unacceptable. Such a "knife-edge" instant is an abstraction which does not accord with our experience of the succession of experiencings in inner time. We experience a continuity in our conscious life and this continuity can only be accomplished within the present as the field of those experiences that we live in.

The vivid present encompasses everything that is actually lived through, it includes elements of the past retained or recollected in the Now and elements of the Future entering the Now by way of protention and anticipation (FPM §14).

The structure of the present, the degree to which the past is

remembered and the future anticipated, does not remain invariable. According to Schutz, its structure is determined by what Schutz calls, following Bergson, the "tension of our consciousness." Depending upon our activities at the present moment, a greater or lesser role will be played by our recollections and expectations. Our activities in the world of daily life engaged with other people and with things requires a very high degree of this "tension," which Schutz terms "wide-awakeness."[32]

In this high degree of conscious tension we are oriented toward affairs in the world which we share with others, and this full attention to life demands that attention be paid primarily to the spatialized (shared) time of our life together with others. Our life with others demands that we live in accordance with a time which is not our own—a spatialized time which passes steadily whether we are happy or sad, frightened or overjoyed, expectant or nostalgic. Only with lower tensions of consciousness do we begin to catch sight of the flow of our own *durée* which may have been completely ignored before we withdrew our full attention from the spatio–temporal world of our life with others in the working world.

Schutz's theory of time, here only sketchily presented, attempts to explain the interconnection of one experience with another in inner time, which is, as such, without reference to spatial elements. Such an explanation is crucial for an understanding of the musical experience—an experience which has been defined as an experience without reference to spatial elements. Schutz's concept of the changing structure of the present is especially interesting, but it can only be fully appreciated in the light of his theory of relevance. It may be added that realistic accounts of time fail to consider as a rule this changing structure of the present, and Schutz's theory is greatly enhanced by his account of this phenomenon.

VII. SCHUTZ'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ACT OF LISTENING

Before extending our investigations into the constitution of the musical theme—the central investigation of the essay "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music"—and ultimately to a consideration of the social interactions involved in musical experience and performance as presented in "Making Music Together," we must recall, this time in a slightly different light, the strict limitations of the phenomenological investigation. Ultimately the positive results of this approach must be sought within these limits.

What has been presented represents Schutz's attempt to investigate the acts of listening which together constitute our experience of music. The phenomenological approach is a *reflective* consideration of musical experience, i.e., it requires that the investigator reflectively grasp musical experience in such a way that he can examine the activities and structures essential to all musical consciousness. The reflective attitude determines the field of phenomenological investigation in a decisive manner.

> We make objects of the acts of listening guided by a theoretical interest in that phenomenon of consciousness which is called "listening to music." We are not induced to do so because we hope to improve our understanding of music, and it is by no means contended that any listener or even some listeners are aware of the interplay of retentions described. It is very important to make it perfectly clear that the experience of listening itself has quite another structure (FPM §25).

To examine reflectively acts of listening and to listen, Schutz here emphasizes, are two very different activities. Or to put it another way, a phenomenological account *of* musical experience is not equivalent to the *experience* of listening itself. This reflective method should not be confused with that which it reflects upon. Furthermore, the phenomenological approach does not prescribe the methods to be used while listening to music, i.e., it is not a form of music appreciation or of music theory. These other ways of viewing musical experience are, to be sure, important for a complete understanding of the experience of music, but they are not the same as a phenomenological investigation. Schutz stresses this.

Keeping in mind, then, that the following analyses are reflectively concerned with the act of listening to a work of music and utilizing the results from the previous section, we discover the following with respect to the perception of the sequence of tones c, d, e, c, d, d. No information is provided concerning the duration of any of the tones, the tonality of the musical composition, or the particular musical

culture which would provide a basic frame of reference for the piece. As the music begins, we perceive in the vivid experience of our actual Now the tone c. This tone is of a certain duration and is experienced as persisting. This means that combined with the actual experience of the tone c, is the retention of the initial phases of the experience of the same, enduring tone. Tone d follows and is experienced in the vivid present. Combined with this vivid, immediate experience of the tone d is the retention of the now just completed experience of the tone c. Included as an element of this retention is the interval c–d with its corresponding upward impulse. Tone e follows and this tone is also experienced in a vivid present. The complex of retentions becomes more complicated by virtue of the introduction of this latest tonal element. There is

1) the present actual experience of the tone e;

2) the vivid retention of the just past experience of the tone d, with the accompanying interval d–e;

3) as an element in the retention of the tone d is the tone c as a previous retentional element, and thus the interval c–d;

4) through the process of the retention of a retention the interval c–e enters into the experience.

With the introduction of the fourth tone, c, a process of recognition is brought into play in which this tone is identified as being the same pitch as the first tone. A similar process occurs identifying the fifth tone (d) with the second (d), and once again the upward impulse is created by means of the retention of c. At this point, i.e., before the introduction of the final tone, the identification of the fourth c with the first and the fifth tone with the second may lead the listener to expect, by way of protention, that the sixth tone will be an e, i.e., the expectation is that the tone sequence c–d–e will be repeated. This expectation is based upon the recognition of this tone sequence as a unit, a "theme," which will immediately be repeated. However, the introduction of the sixth tone as a d does not fulfill this expectation. We are led, Schutz says, to identify the entire tone sequence c, d, e, c, d, d as a unit.

The remaining investigations in Sections 21 through 25 of "Fragments" are based upon the results of this analysis; in particular, upon a comparison of the relationship between the fifth and sixth tones in the sequence, both experienced as the tone d, and the experience of the enduring first tone c. When the experience of the enduring first tone was examined, a coincidence was discovered between the actual experience of the tone and the retention of earlier phases of the experience of the same tone. In other words, an enduring tone is experienced. There was no gap between the actual experience of the tone c and the retention of earlier phases of our experience of it. The perception of the fifth and sixth tones in the example, however, is different. Although both tones are experienced as the same, one enduring tone d has not been experienced. Rather, the fifth tone with its corresponding beginning and end-phase is first experienced, and then this experience is followed by the experience of the initiation of a second d. This last example, is not an experience of the endurance of the same tone through successive phases of our experience, but the experience of the repetition of the "same." Comparing these two experiences, Schutz identifies three sets of problems important for the phenomenology of the musical experience, which he groups into three categories: the category of continuance and repetition; the category of sameness; the category of movement.

A The category of continuance and repetition

Schutz merely outlined the wide range of problems included within this category, which we shall summarize very briefly. Schutz deals with the phenomena of continuance and repetition as applied to three distinct musical situations. First, in the case of the repetition of the same tone, i.e., a repeated bass tone, he discovers that a repeated bass note serves the same function in a composition as a continuous or sustained bass tone (each is called a "pedalpoint"). The reason for this experienced similarity is that distinct repetitions of the same tone are perceived as a "specious continuance." Retention functions as a mechanism whereby the intermittent tones are experienced as coinciding. "*Repetition*—as used here—is merely a special case of the intermittence of a continuance" (FPM §21). Second, musical

experience also provides instances in which a "virtual unity" is established, by way of retention, between notes of different pitches. To distinguish this experience of unity from that of continuance, Schutz uses the term "coherence." Finally, the terms "continuance" and "repetition" take on yet another meaning if applied to the musical theme or to groups of themes. Retention alone is no longer solely responsible for these experiences. Reproduction of the completed experiences is required for the "synthesis of recognition" and thus for the experience of repetition. Continuance, on the other hand, originates in the fulfilment of previous anticipations in actual experience.

B The category of sameness

Schutz's comparison of the experience of an enduring tone with that of the repetition of the same tone uncovered the difficulties involved in the recognition of "sameness." Husserl accounted for the experience of sameness upon the basis of a passive synthesis of identification.[33] Such a synthesis

> . . . brings the recollection of a past experience of the same object of thought by "superposition" [*Deckung*] into congruence with a renewed originary experience of the same (or, at a secondary level, produces such a congruence between recollections or even recollections of recollections of the same) (FPM §22).

The complexity of the problem is further indicated when Husserl insists that there is a need to distinguish between sameness and likeness. Likeness refers to the perception of similarity between two objects or parts of the same object, which are nonetheless experienced as different. Also, an object may be experienced as the same despite the fact that it has undergone modification, i.e., as the same but modified. An examination of musical experience would have to consider the phenomena of sameness and likeness in connection with both single tone and the theme as a sequence of tones.

Schutz's investigation is confined to a consideration of the repetition of the tone d as the "same." Without a doubt the repeated tone is the "same," however, it is not *strictly* the same, i.e., as in the experience of the enduring tone c. The repeated tone d differs from the

enduring tone c in several respects. First, it is a repeated tone with its own initial phase and development, the experience of which includes the retention of the previous d in its competed development. Second, the introduction of the second d alters or adds something to the previous experience. Musical experience offers many examples of this phenomenon, all of which share a common origin in the structure of consciousness.

> The same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same; it is not even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infinitesimally, but, nevertheless changed—by already having once pre-experienced the tone d in the same context (FPM §22).

This change is indicated by the fact that the interplay of retentions and protentions necessarily change with the introduction of each new experience. Thus, in the peformance of a musical work this small but significant change is reflected in the different articulation given to the second d by the performer. The difference between a poor performance and an excellent one can lie in the performer's sensitivity to such seemingly small but significant differences.

C The category of movement

It is not clear that "movement" should be considered in the same way that continuance, repetition, and sameness, i.e., as a basic category of musical experience, as seems to be indicated in Section 20 of "Fragments." Movement belongs to that sphere of experience which has been called "outer" and would thus appear to be an element foreign to the experience of music—an experience in inner time. To be sure, Schutz maintains that movement is foreign to musical experience. His account of movement is, rather, a continuation of his discussion of sameness, which includes his critical evaluation of Husserl's investigation of this phenomenon.

According to Schutz, phenomenological investigations, particularly Husserl's, have remained confined to perceptual experience of individual objects in the external world. Perception has been taken as the paradigm experience and the "rigid visible and tangible object as the paradigm of the notion of 'thing' " (FPM §23). Schutz main-

tains that it was on the basis of this assumption that Husserl formulated his concept of the experience of sameness. In the case of visible or tangible objects the recognition of one object as the same or similar to another can be verified by various kinaesthetic experiences, thereby achieving the "synthesis of identification." For example, I see the lamp on my desk, and then close my eyes or turn my head. Performing certain kinaesthetic acts has removed this desk and lamp from my field of vision. By performing an opposite kinaesthetic act, however, I can bring the lamp back into my field of vision and re-experience it is the "same" as seen before. The lamp persists and remains available as an enduring object.

However, we recall that auditory experiences belong essentially to our inner experience of reality and that the ear alone constructs no experience of space in which are found the rigid objects of outer or spatial experience. What Schutz indicates is that an essentially different kind of experience is involved in music, and that what holds for sight and touch does not necessarily hold for hearing.

For example, there is a difference between our experience of the phenomenon of intermittence in visual and auditory experience. In the example above, intermittence is the result of the performance of various kinaesthetic acts which interrupt or re-establish the experiencing of the lamp as the same. Our examination of the repetition of the tone d, however, revealed a different way in which intermittence could be understood.

> In the purely auditive field, however, in the realm of music, intermittence can never be ascribed to a kinaesthetic change, which re-establishes or even verifies sameness. Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear (FPM §23).

This suggests that the mechanism, whereby one object is identified with another, operates differently in the dimension of inner time than it does in the spatial dimension. "Sameness" has a different meaning for each of these experiences, i.e., it refers to a different kind of phenomenon. When an object in the spatial dimension is designated as the same this usually refers to the fact that, although our experience of this object was interrupted, the object itself persisted

unchanged. "Likeness," on the other hand, with respect to spatial experience refers to the possibility of comparing one object with another and thus to the dimension of space "within which alone two objects may coexist as distinct and separate unities" (FPM §23). In the dimension of inner time, proper to purely auditory experiences, the phenomena of sameness and likeness do not refer to coexistent objects, but to successive ones. Schutz concludes that,

> . . . in the dimension of inner time, or in the purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numerical unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the term "sameness" exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness . . . (FPM §23).

Schutz's claim that the synthesis of identification operates differently in the spatial and auditory realms of experience raises questions as to the general validity of Husserl's notion of "passive synthesis." It appears that this notion also originates in the unquestioned acceptance of the paradigmatic nature of perceptual experience. In perceptual experience intermittence resulted from the performance of various kinaesthetic acts by means of which we return to the same spatial field of experience. We are always, in principle, free to reverse the order of kinaesthetic acts once performed and to return to a former position. It is this ability which "creates the impression as though a passive synthesis of 'superimposition' had been performed, but such an impression prevails only in hindsight" (FPM §24). The freedom to perform the opposite kinaesthetic act and to return to a former spatial field tends to obscure the difference between the original experience and the recollection of it at a later time. The spatial field, too, is first constituted in a series of polythetic steps, but the experience of recollection is different because I am no longer compelled to run through the various polythetic steps which taken together first effected the constitution of this field.

> What I am comparing is the recollection of the outcome of this previous process, once performed, the recollection of the ready-made picture I had in mind when leaving my home-position, with the actual ready-made experience I have when returning to it (FPM §24).

The impression of a passive synthesis is created by the possibility in

the spatial dimension of grasping monothetically a field of experience first built up in the polythetic activities of consciousness. Upon the successful completion of the necessary kinaesthetic acts I grasp the field monothetically and compare it in recollection with the outcome of the original experience. However, if the spatial field returned to by means of appropriate kinaesthetic acts is not grasped monothetically, the illusion of the passive synthesis ought to disappear. If we once again perform the polythetic acts which originally constituted the spatial field the impression of a simple "over-laying" will disappear.[34]

Inner experience, on the other hand, has been characterized as a continual flux, as the irreversible stream of consciousness. Monothetic grasping of this flux itself and of objects which exist purely in this dimension is precluded by the very irreversibility of the flux. There is no possibility, while living this flux, of changing perspectives or of regaining a former position. Whereas the spatial dimension allows for both monothetic and polythetic recognition, the dimension of inner time allows only for polythetic recognition.

The work of music exists as an audible object within the dimension of inner time. As long as we are immersed in the unfolding of the musical events, the acts of recognition of successive experiences as the same or different must be performed polythetically. Before listening to a particular work of music which I have already heard and know well, I may think of a particular theme and anticipate its development. I may view the entire work of music from the point of view of this theme and its recurrence and development. The rest of the work may be interpreted as a development of this one theme. But when I adopt such a "point of view" I am no longer immersed in the ongoing musical process. While immersed in the musical process itself the recognition of a recurrent theme as the same or different occurs not through a passive synthesis of recognition, but through a *step by step*, polythetic re-experiencing of steps once experienced and now re-experienced. These steps lead to the constitution of a unit: the theme. Only by performing or re-performing the polythetic steps of this constitutive process can we experience sameness or similarity in musical experience.[35]

VIII. CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE MUSICAL THEME

We have as yet to consider the manner in which a theme is constituted as a unit in experience. Consider, for example, the four note theme which introduces Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. These four notes are clearly experienced as a musical theme. The omission of one or more of the notes does not lead to the experience of another unit; it only destroys the impression of a unit experienced when all four notes are played consecutively. Furthermore, when performed this tonal sequence is articulated in a way that emphasizes the fact that these four notes belong together

Schutz says that articulation "implies, certainly, a feeling of virtual finality." This means, that upon hearing the fourth note the listener experiences a sense of completion in which the interplay of retentions and protentions do not call for the addition of further elements. The original impulse has come to an end and that which was conveyed, i.e., the meaning, is now offered as a fragment of the whole. Articulation points back to that specific structure of experience which enables the meaning of the musical events to emerge as they unfold simultaneously with the flux of inner experience. What Schutz calls "virtual," "initially corresponds to what James called the 'resting places' of thought" (FPM §25). James's concept of the peculiar structure of the stream of consciousness, is used here as an important element in Schutz's investigation of musical experience. James maintained that there are periods of activity separated by phases of rest in conscious life. The periods of rest represent a significant aspect of conscious life in that they articulate the periods of activity bringing the activity of one phase to an end and thereby allowing for the emergence of a new phase of activity. James compared this structure to the flight of a bird which is intermittently interrupted when the bird alights. It is this articulation of the stream of consciousness which causes meaning to emerge. Schutz recognized that the musical work also has phases of movement or activity alternating with phases of rest. Existing within the realm of inner time, the musical work makes use of the very means which produce meaning within the stream of consciousness. Through "phrasing,"

the musical means of articulation, the musical units or themes arise which are experienced as meaningful.

By means of the art of phrasing, the musical work is articulated in such a way that distinct units, some complete and others not, all with their own impulse and resting points, emerge from the flux of the musical experience. Although no special notation may indicate these phrases, the musical work is structured in such a way that in its performance it indicates to the listener what belongs together as a unit or sub-unit.

> The art of musical phrasing consists in making each unit and sub-unit discernible by bringing together into one single phrase what belongs together, and to separate it from the next phrase by a very short interruption of the flux of music . . . (FPM §25).

It is this very short interruption in the musical flux that is crucial for the emergence of the experience of meaning, for it is precisely in these brief moments of interruption that the listener immersed in the musical experience is invited by the composer to reflect upon the now completed experiences which have led to this phrase's completion in such a way that meaning arises.[36]

Naturally, the composer of the musical work does not intend that all of the listener's past experiences, retained or reproduced, to be recollected. These short pauses in musical experience have a much more limited function. Reflection in these brief interludes is guided by a principle of relevancy. Depending upon the particular Now in which the reflective stance is assumed, different experiences are seen as relevant, as contributing to the present experience and making it what it is. Thus, depending upon the Now in which the reflective attitude is assumed different past experiences become important. When the four note theme from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is articulated by means of phrasing in such a way that a short interruption in the musical flux is created, the listener is invited to reflect from the end of the phrase to the beginning. Through the interplay of retention he becomes aware of the peculiar structure of this unit and of the fact that it continues a single impulse from beginning to end. He may also become aware of the characteristic rhythmic articulation which distinguishes this unit giving it its specific character, etc.

Schutz indicates that the process of selecting what is relevant is

guided by recollections which are imposed upon the listener as well as those which are freely selected. Under the category of imposed recollections, Schutz includes the various phenomena traditionally grouped under "association." When we try to recall a particular past experience of music, we often find ourselves confronted with a whole group of past experiences merely incidental to the one directly under consideration, e.g., those experiences which are like, the same as, or similar to the experience considered in the present. On the other hand, upon hearing this particular theme we may recall all sorts of facts about the musical culture to which this piece belongs. We might recall, for example, that this composition can be placed in the context of a musical tradition generally familiar to the Western ear and extending from the time of Bach to the present; or, that this work is considered an example of music from the Romantic period in Western music. Some of these recollections will be important for our present experience while others may be disregarded as irrelevant. The reflective selection of experiences can also be guided voluntarily by the phenomena of attention and interest.

> Attention is a function of the interest dominating the Now in which the reflective attitude is performed. This interest itself is constituted by the stock of my previous experiences, my knowledge at hand, by the protentions and anticipations prevailing at this time . . . (FPM §25).

Within the context of musical experience, attention is directed by our interest in, and decision to listen to, music. The listener is interested in understanding the music in its unfolding; and, by means of this guiding interest, with its corresponding anticipations of emergent musical meaning, which themselves are based upon past experiences sedimented in the form of the stock of knowledge at hand, his attention is focused upon the musical events. Once immersed in these musical events the listener will also be guided by the musical structure itself, which has been arranged in such a way that he is led to react in an appropriate manner. Thus, there would seem to be an interplay here between the listener's anticipations, which emerge from his stock of musical knowledge at hand, and his actual musical experience. His knowledge of other compositions by Beethoven and of the characteristics peculiar to music composed

during the Romantic period may lead to the anticipation of a certain development of the four note theme of the Fifth Symphony. The listener's present musical experiences may confirm these anticipations based upon his stock of musical knowledge which operates like a point of reference for his present experience; or, the present experience may frustrate these anticipations.

Through this dynamic interplay of expectations and recollections the musical theme is constituted and emerges as the fundamental unit of meaning for musical experience. Once constituted, it, too, can become an element of our stock of musical knowledge. According to Schutz, it becomes a *Gestalt* which can be recognized "as an entity with particular meaning." For example, having heard a particular Bach fugue many times or having performed it, the listener will recognize the theme immediately, the last phases will be anticipated as the initial phases are suggested, it will be continually recognized throughout the piece as the same theme, or as the same but modified if it is extended in time, invested, combined with other elements, transposed into a different key, etc. "Finally, it may become entirely familiar, it will be known in such a way that no recollection will be necessary. It has been remembered and is now at hand" (FPM §25).

IX. THE PROCESS OF MUSICAL COMMUNICATION

The focus of our investigation changes as we begin to consider the essay "Making Music Together" (1951), as an essay which explores the phenomenon of musical communication—the shared participation of the ongoing flow of the musical content. But "Making Music Together" also represents more than a presentation of the phenomenology of musical experience in just another context. As an essay in "applied theory," it represents an attempt by Schutz, to utilize "theory for a more adequate interpretation of social reality" (CP II ix).

In "Making Music Together" Schutz investigates the complex of social interactions in their varying degrees of intensity, which are involved in the process of musical communication among the composer, conductor, performers and listeners. Utilizing the results of

his investigations in "Fragments," Schutz recognizes the process of the communication of musical meaning as an outstanding example of those "pre-communicative," non-conceptual social interactions which are presupposed by communication understood as a semantic system.[37] Investigations into social phenomena are combined with investigations into the phenomenology of musical experience to produce this essay in "applied theory."

Schutz says that there is

> . . . a strong tendency in contemporary thought to identify meaning with its semantic expression and to consider language, speech, symbols, significant gestures, as the fundamental condition of social intercourse as such (MMT 161).

It is Schutz's thesis, on the other hand, that all communication, including language, a semantic system, symbols, etc., is founded upon a type of social interaction which he terms the "mutual tuning-in relationship." This social interaction is pre-communicative and non-conceptual, and although it forms the ground of possibility for communication itself, it can neither be grasped by, nor does it enter into the process of communication (MMT 161). It forms the substratum of human interactions, so to speak, and the possibility for the emergence of language as the "paramount vehicle of communication" (MMT 160). It is not surprising that Schutz chose the process of the communication of musical meaning as his example. As we have seen, as early as 1944 in the essay "Fragments" Schutz had come to understand music as a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time, and the musical experience as a polythetic grasping of this step-by-step occurrence in inner time. The unavailability of musical meaning for a conceptual grasping makes it an ideal example for investigating the manner in which meaning is communicated pre-linguistically.

Any investigation of the manner in which musical meaning is communicated is immediately confronted with the system of musical notation and its function as a technical means for the communication of musical meaning. However, with respect to the system of musical notation, it must be remembered that we are not to identify the musical meaning with the particular means of its communication. The specific meaning of a work will maintain its self-identity

despite the form of communication utilized and regardless of the fact that this same meaning may be communicated in many distinct performances at different times. Schutz contrasts the self-identical nature of the meaning of the musical work with the multiplicity of means through which this meaning can be communicated. We must also resist the temptation to identify musical communication with the system of musical notation and to further interpret this means of communication as a "musical language." "Musical notation is," according to Schutz, "just one among several vehicles of communicating musical thought" (MMT 165).

This is easy to demonstrate, e.g., I may be unable to read musical notation and yet be able to understand the musical meaning which is communicated by purely auditory means. In fact, the transmitted musical meaning need never have been communicated through notation. Also, musical notation should not be interpreted as the language system of music. The function of musical notation is a different one. A written word refers to a certain spoken sound. Such referring may suggest an identification of the written word with musical notation, which also is a set of instructions for producing a certain sound. But Schutz is quick to point out that the written word in a language system refers primarily to the *concept* conveyed by the spoken word (MMT 166). Musical notation, on the other hand, has no such possibility since, as we have seen, "the meaning of a musical process cannot be related to a conceptual scheme" (MMT 166). Furthermore, musical notation admits of various interpretations and can only approximate the intentions of the composer as to how the musical meaning is to be communicated. It is left more or less to the performer to interpret the prescriptions offered through the musical notation so as to achieve the most effective communication of the musical work. Finally, musical notation should not be identified with the "musical culture" of the musical work, which serves as a point of reference for the interpretation of the musical meaning as well as the musical notation. Musical notation requires for its interpretation the preacquired stock of musical experiences which are socially conditioned. Musical notation itself refers back to a necessary fundamental social stratum of the musical experience. According to Schutz,

> . . . the player approaching a so-called unknown piece of music does so from a historically—in one's own case, autobiographically—determined situation, determined by his stock of musical experiences at hand in so far as they are typically relevant to the anticipated novel experience before him. This stock of experiences refers indirectly to all his past and present fellow-men whose acts or thoughts have contributed to the building up of his knowledge (MMT 168).

Thus, the communication of musical meaning is accomplished against the background of a socially conditioned stock of musical experiences which, so to speak, sets the stage for the actual performance of a work of music. However, Schutz's investigations do not end with the discovery of this historical determination of the musical experience. The stock of musical experiences at hand "constitutes merely the setting" for the primary social relationship which makes possible the communication of musical meaning (MMT 169). We must now examine the nature of the various social relationships which exist between the composer, performer, and listener.

We begin with a consideration of that situation in which a listener or single performer enters into a social relationship with the composer of a work of music. We assume that the transition has been accomplished, in the presence of that "tension of consciousness" characteristic of the musical experience, to a new attitude which prepares the listener to follow the flux of the music in such a way that his expectation that this musical work is a meaningful context will be fulfilled. He is prepared to follow the invitation and suggestions contained in the musical flux itself. The focus of attention, i.e., that which constitutes the "thematic kernel" of conscious life, is the intention to seize upon the musical meaning of the composer, and, in the case of the performer, to achieve "its interpretation by re-creation" (MMT 169).

> This thematic kernel stands out against the horizon of pre-acquired knowledge, which knowledge functions as a scheme of reference and interpretation for the grasping of the composer's thought (MMT 169).

The flux of musical events begins, and as the listener or performer participates in this flux, he becomes immersed in the process of emergence of the musical meaning through a series of irreversible events occurring in the flux of inner time. Meaning emerges because the composer has arranged the musical elements in such a way that

those activities of conscious life that interrelate all experiences, i.e., retention, recollection, protention and anticipation, are used to interrelate the successive elements of the musical flux in inner time. The manner in which the successive elements of the musical process are interrelated was the focus of interest in "Fragments." Of interest in the present essay is the social relationship which exists between the composer and the listener or lone performer of the musical work.

To inquire into the nature of the social relationship prevailing between the composer and the listener may at first appear to be a rather dubious undertaking. It is quite likely that the composer and the listener may be temporally separated by a span of hundreds of years. How can the listener enter into a social relationship with a composer whom he has never known and may never have the opportunity to know? An answer to this question must be sought for in the nature of the musical experience itself.

The social relationship between the listener and composer is explained in the following manner. Upon hearing the first notes of the musical work, the listener immerses himself in the ongoing flux of musical events as they occur. He grasps the musical meaning by "living in" and "re-producing" the step by step flux of the articulated musical events in inner time. This polythetically constituted musical work, itself existing in inner time, however, is none other than the musical meaning originally intended by the composer and communicated by means of a series of events in the world.

> We have therefore the following situation: two series of events in inner time, one belonging to the stream of consciousness of the composer, the other to the stream of consciousness of the beholder, are lived through in simultaneity, which simultaneity is created by the ongoing flux of the musical process (MMT 173).

It is Schutz's thesis that the process whereby a quasi-simultaneous sharing of experiences in inner time and the "reconstruction of a vivid present" occurs, represents a derived form of "the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the 'We,' which is at the foundation of all possible communication" (MMT 173). The listener polythetically grasps the musical meaning intended by the composer, which is communicated by means of activities in the dimension of outer time, e.g., the performance, but which themselves belong to the dimension of inner time. Thus, the listener and composer are united by the ongoing flux of musical events, they share in quasi-simultaneity that "derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relation" (MMT 171f.).

This "mutual tuning-in relationship" admits of various degrees of intensity as becomes evident from an investigation of the role of the performer in the musical process of communication. The performer acts as an intermediary in this process. With the introduction of the performer in the process of musical communication, however, the web of social relationships becomes more complex, since his experiences refer to both the composer and the audience.

> It is the eminent social function of the performer—the singer or player of an instrument—to be the intermediary between composer and listener. By his re-creation of the musical process the performer partakes in the stream of consciousness of the composer as well as of the listener. He thereby enables the latter to become immersed in the particular articulation of the flux of inner time which is the specific meaning of the piece of music in question (MMT 174).

It is the performer's responsibility correctly to re-create the specific musical meaning first intended by the composer. For those listeners unable to share in the ongoing flux of the musical process without the aid of audible sounds, the performer's performance offers them the sole opportunity to become acquainted with the work. This function of the performer becomes clear when several distinct performances of the same work are compared. What we discover is that in one or more of these performances, the performer executed his role more perfectly and was able to transmit more of the musical meaning than in other performances. We say in such a case that the piece was better executed, more meaningful, etc. In these performances the listener becomes aware of more of the interconnections which lead to the formation of the specific meaning and themes of the work. To be sure, we notice that a particular performer may be able to penetrate deeply into one composer's musical works and yet fail to understand another composer's, i.e., the performer is sensitive to the particular musical meanings and their arrangements peculiar to one particular composer and can share his musical experiences to a greater degree that those of another composer. The effectiveness of the performance

depends upon the degree to which the performer can become immersed in the flux of musical events which together form the musical meaning of the work, and upon the performer's ability to communicate this musical meaning in the performance.

Although it is of "no great importance" whether the performer enters into a relationship with the listener in a mediated or immediate way, Schutz does say that those cases in which the performance is mediated by a mechanical device always refer back to the situation in which the performer and the listener "share together a vivid present in face-to-face relation" (MMT 174). This latter situation is the "paramount situation" according to Schutz. Here the listener is able to experience the immediate presence of the performer. The performer is recognized as such by the members of the audience, and together they experience one another spatially and temporally in the mode of immediacy.[38] Take the example of a solo pianist and his audience. As a member of the audience I am attentive to the ongoing flux of the musical process. The intention to seize upon the particular meaning of this work forms the thematic focus of my conscious life. The question arises, then, as to why I become so absorbed with the visual aspects of the performance. Why don't I simply settle back in my seat, close my eyes and listen to the music? Why is it that as the musical performance begins the members of the audience position themselves in such a way that they have optimal visual contact with the performer? From these and other phenomena we must conclude that this particular situation, in which the musical meaning is communicated in person, is particularly vivid for both the audience and the performer. A process of mutual orientation, of taking one another into account, takes place between the performer and his audience, e.g., the phenomena of applause and bowing reflect this mutual orientation. The audience watches the performer and interprets his motions, facial expression, etc., as indications of the nature or the intensity of the feeling and involvement. As the performer becomes more immersed in the ongoing flux of the musical events, the audience takes notice of this and with growing enthusiasm participates more fully in the meaning of the work. The performer in this immediate situation has more opportunities to create an understanding audience as he offers to share with them the possibility for a

greater appreciation of the work. Furthermore, the audience's reactions may help the performer enhance his performance and thereby communicate more of the musical meaning. The process is reciprocal.

> In all these circumstances performer and listener are "tuned-in" to one another, are living together through the same flux, are growing older together while the musical process lasts. The statement applies . . . primarily to the co-performance in simultaneity of the polythetic steps by which the musical content articulates itself in inner time. Since, however, all performance as an act of communication is based upon a series of events in the outer world . . . it can be said that the social relationship between performer and listener is founded upon the common experience of living together simultaneously in several dimensions of time (MMT 174f.).

As the title "Making Music Together" indicates, the investigations are carried one step further to include a consideration of the relationship among two or more performers of a musical work. Once again we find that the social relationships are founded upon the simultaneous sharing of all those involved in different dimensions of time. The difference in this situation lies in the fact that whereas the listener's acts of co-performance were merely internal, the co-performers must execute activities occurring in the spatial dimension simultaneously with activities in inner time; and furthermore, be so oriented to their fellow performers as to reciprocally take into account their experiences in both the dimension of inner time and that of the outer, spatial dimension.

Consequently, each performer's action is oriented not only to the composer's intended meanings, but also to his audience and to his fellow performers (MMT 175). We can test Schutz's claims concerning this situation of making music together, by investigating the limiting situation in which only two performers are involved.

Each of these performers, say a pianist and a violinist, has a prescribed part to play in the performance (we thus ignore the important musical activity of improvisation for the moment). The composer has so arranged the musical work that the fragmentary activities of each of the performers, when performed simultaneously, will form a harmonious and meaningful process unfolding step-by-step in inner and outer experience. To achieve this harmonious integration of activities, however, it is required that each of the

performers take into account the other's activities. Through a series of protentions and retentions, each must be able to anticipate the activities of the other. But the anticipations in this situation extend beyond the purely auditory sphere and the unfolding of the musical events in inner time, because the co-performers here enjoy spatial immediacy as well. Each of their actions is available to the other. The gestures and expressions of the Other are available for interpretation as indications of what he may do next. The two performers do not perform the work in total disregard of one another. They look at one another, gesture and signal to one another, accommodate their activities to those performed by the other, etc. In other words, they live together through the flux of the musical events following the suggestions that the composer has incorporated in the work itself, as well as the suggestions of the fellow performer.

In the more complicated situation in which many individuals are involved in the performance, the immediacy of the limiting situation is lost. As Schutz indicates, it is the role of the conductor to "establish with each of the performers the contact which they are unable to find with one another in immediacy" (MMT 176). The members of a symphony orchestra are unable to share in an immediate face-to-face relationship with one another. They look to the conductor for an indication of the activities of all the others. The very arrangement of the symphony orchestra reflects the importance of the role played by the conductor. All of the performers are arranged so as to make possible direct visual contact with the conductor. Through visual contact with the expressive activities of the conductor the performers are once again brought into contact with one another, although in a mediated manner, in both the dimension of inner and outer experience. The conductor is the means by which a real "community of space" is maintained between many performers, thus unifying their experiences into a "vivid present."

We might add, that, although Schutz does not mention the relationship of the conductor and performers to the audience, this relationship could be analyzed in a similar way. For the members of the audience attending the performance given by a symphony orchestra, the conductor also plays a key role in establishing the "vivid present" of which Schutz speaks. In the case in which one performer or a

small group of performers face an audience, there exists for the members of the audience at least the possibility of watching each of the performers. The various expressive activities involved in the musical process of communication are available as indications and suggestions as to what course the musical experience will take, etc. Confronted with an entire symphony orchestra the situation changes drastically. The members of the audience can no longer grasp in such immediacy the activities in which the performers express their involvement in the musical process. The conductor's activities replace, for the audience as well as for the many performers in such a situation, "the immediate grasping of the expressive activities" (MMT 176f.). The conductor's gestures, which evoke in the spatial dimension those musical events belonging properly to the dimension of inner time, are also a point of reference for the audience, establishing a "community of space" which unifies the fluxes of inner time of the audience and performers in such a way that they are synchronized "into a vivid present" (MMT 177). The performers, the conductor, and the members of the audience emerge from the completed musical experience with the feeling that they have *together* shared the musical meaning intended by the composer and communicated in the performance.

X. CONCLUSIONS

To provide a definitive statement concerning the phenomenological approach to musical experience upon the basis of the preceding investigation of Alfred Schutz's work would be difficult if not impossible. It would be difficult both because only Schutz's work in this field has been presented,[39] and because of the fact that Schutz's work itself was left uncompleted and thus merely indicates the direction for further phenomenologically oriented studies. Thus, all that will be offered by way of conclusion are some suggestions concerning the importance of Schutz's work in establishing a foundation for a phenomenology of musical experience.

In the first two sections we attempted to discover what it means to investigate music phenomenologically. It was concluded, upon the

basis of Schutz's work, that the phenomenological approach to musical experience is a reflective approach which concerns itself with the essential features of musical consciousness and the musical work understood as an ideal object. Thus, Schutz proceeds by reflectively considering music as it appears to consciousness and in this way discovers an important structural feature of musical experience. Schutz discovers that, upon the adoption of the peculiar attitude necessary for listening to music, the meaning of all of our experiences undergoes a peculiar alteration (FPM §15), he discovers the finite province of musical meaning.

I would like to suggest that the importance of Schutz's work for establishing a phenomenology of music is to be understood in terms of this concept of the finite province of musical meaning. I find it to be crucial for two reasons:

1) It is an important methodological device which allows Schutz to distinguish the musical experience from other kinds of experiences.

2) The use of this concept of finite provinces of meaning, which is understood by Schutz as possessing certain necessary features which constitute its cognitive or experiential style (CP I 232), allows Schutz to point out essential features of the musical experience.

In this way, the concept of the musical province of meaning becomes an important tool for establishing a general phenomenology of the musical experience. We shall conclude this essay with a short discussion of these two points.

1) In the third section above, we examined the way in which the concept of a finite province of meaning could be applied to musical experience. Primarily we considered the way in which this idea is helpful in differentiating between experience in the everyday working world and that of the world of art. We found that the meaning of our experiences changes when we make the leap from one finite province of meaning to another, e.g., in the finite province of dramatic meaning the spectator is not called upon to "act" but only to observe the action taking place on the stage and thus to bestow upon the dramatic world the "accent of reality." In a similar manner the

arts of music and painting we discussed and this led to the distinction between the world of art and other provinces of meaning, such as that of philosophy, dreams, etc.[40]

What remained implicit for the most part, however, in the discussion in Section III was the fact that this concept can also be used to distinguish between the experiences of various art forms within the world of art itself. To be sure, in "Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music" Schutz prepared the way for a characterization of that which is unique to the finite province of musical meaning by comparing it with the finite provinces of meaning peculiar to other art forms, e.g., literature, painting, dance, ornament, architecture. Schutz's work in "Fragments" can be understood as an attempt to illustrate the fact that not every art form "is a meaningful context of the same kind as that of music" (FPM §2). Schutz's discovery, for example, that musical experience is a form of experience that does not necessarily refer to the listener's spatial experiences, serves to distinguish the musical province of meaning from those of art forms which rely upon the beholder's ability to spatially experience their elements. Also, in Section 2 of "Fragments" Schutz says that music can be distinguished from those art forms which employ language in that it does not have a representative function. Naturally, Schutz's work remains merely programmatic, but his concept of finite provinces of meaning provides the basis for elaborating upon the suggestions already present in his work in order to distinguish between the experiences of various art forms.

2) The musical province of meaning, like every other, has its peculiar cognitive or experiential style which is characterized by

> . . . a specific *epoché*, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective (CP I 232).

With these defining features of every finite province of meaning in mind, Schutz was able to discover several important features of the musical province of meaning. Four of these features will be mentioned in conclusion:

a) the system of relevances peculiar to the musical province of meaning;

b) the role played by musical culture in musical experience;

c) the nature of musical communication;

d) the temporal perspective of the musical experience.

a) According to Schutz, each province of meaning has its own peculiar systems of relevances (RPR 105). In Section III, we tried to illustrate this within the musical province of meaning, by elaborating upon Schutz's own work in "Fragments" (Sections 15–17, 25), "Making Music Together" (169), and in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*. What should be emphasized is the importance of Schutz's recognition of this phenomenon—of the way in which these systems of relevances operate within musical experience and of the part they play in distinguishing the musical province of meaning as unique. Again, Schutz's work is incomplete, but it is clear that the musical province of meaning is distinguished from other provinces of meaning by a unique system of relevances. Once the experiential or cognitive style peculiar to musical experience with its appropriate tension of consciousness has been adopted, a unique system of relevances comes into play. There are for example, particular kinds of motivational relevances which contribute to the constitution of the musical "interest" situation, i.e., the interest in listening to music, to this particular work, etc. This, in turn, leads to the formation of a thematic field within musical experience, with respect to which certain activities, experiences, recollections, etc., are relevant while others are not. In musical experience this interaction of motivational and topical relevances is determined to a large extent by the decision to listen to music and the desire to understand the musical meaning which is thereby communicated. The world becomes one which is interpreted as it appears acoustically, and that which is brought into the thematic focus of conscious life pertains to this world of acoustic meaning.

b) However, Schutz's theory of relevance not only serves to distinguish the musical province of meaning from other provinces of meaning in terms of the systems of relevances peculiar to each, it also offers a basis for a more adequate understanding of musical phenomena, such as musical culture. Not mentioned above in connection with the systems of relevances, musical culture can be properly understood as an essential element for the interpretation, and therefore meaning, of musical experience. Musical culture, according to Schutz, forms a scheme of interpretation, which along with other interpretationally relevant material, makes it possible for the listener, etc., to correctly understand and make sense of his musical experiences. It is musical culture, as we have seen, which influences the composer as he works, provides the performer with a basis for interpreting the musical work, and which is even, in part, responsible for the fact that the listener finds himself unable to listen to "new" music. Thus, musical culture has an *essential* function within musical experience, a function which must be examined phenomenologically with regard to its structure, etc.

It might be added, that Schutz's recognition of the essential role played by musical culture has importance beyond the scope of a strictly phenomenological investigation as well. For if it is true that musical experience necessarily includes musical culture as its frame of reference, then this recognition also brings to light the tremendous influence which musical culture can have upon musical experience. Consequently it can be seen, for example, that the role played by critics, music theorists and historians, etc., is a crucial one. A responsible form of music theory and appreciation is required, in which the historian or theorist does not merely compile a list of biographical information or technical terms. Realizing the role which his work plays (or can play) within musical experience, the theorist should approach his work accordingly. The aim of responsible musical scholarship ultimately, is to enable the listener, performer, composer or conductor to better understand the musical meaning communicated in musical experience.

c) We must not fail to include in this summary the insights yielded by Schutz's investigations of the shared experience of the musical work, i.e., his investigations of the specific form of sociality peculiar to the musical province of meaning. There is little doubt that this constitutes Schutz's best known and most impressive contribution to the understanding of the musical experience as a whole. Although the musical work can, in principle, remain uncommunicated, it is also true that the composer creates the musical work with

"communicative intent" (MMT 170) and that only insofar as the work is communicated in some manner does it become intersubjectively available and of interest to a community of appreciators. For the most part, discussions of musical phenomena presuppose that the work of music is intersubjectively available. A music historian discusses the historical development of Western music, the careers of individual composers and distinct musical forms and styles without considering the manner in which the work of music can be shared and understood by others. A music theorist studies the particular structure of the work of music without asking how it is that he can share in the musical meaning of the work. For the listener who is actually listening to a work of music, of course, the problem doesn't arise as to *how* the musical meaning can be shared. As a member of the audience, he simply listens. But when we attempt to understand the musical experience itself, we must ask how an audience can share a musical work with the composer, the performers and the conductor. Schutz's investigations of the peculiar form of sociality within the musical province of meaning in "Making Music Together" make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the problem of the web of social relationships involved in the musical experience.

d) Finally, the musical province of meaning is distinguished from other provinces of meaning by its particular temporal perspective. As we have seen, Schutz maintains that the temporality peculiar to the musical province of meaning is not the objective time proper to the world of everyday life, but the inner time of the stream of consciousness. It is in inner time that the musical meaning is constituted, and since musical meaning is such that it can only be polythetically grasped, inner time must be understood as the very form of existence of music, i.e., music is "a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time" (MMT 170).

We do not wish to restate here in its entirety Schutz's investigation of this point, but only to indicate the importance of his recognition and investigation of this structural feature of the province of musical meaning. Musical consciousness, Schutz has demonstrated, concerned as it is with musical meaning, is limited to musical meaning *as* it appears, i.e., how it appears. Since musical meaning necessarily

emerges polythetically and always remains only polythetically available, musical consciousness itself is only capable of grasping this meaning polythetically in inner time. Musical meaning does not make its appearance in outer or cosmic time, and thus musical consciousness, which is concerned with the musical meaning as it appears, is confined to that time perspective peculiar to its very own constitution—inner time. This insight constitutes an important contribution to the understanding of the musical experience. Using this insight as a foundation Schutz then continues his reflective consideration of musical experience with an examination of the manner in which the musical elements become integrated within musical experience leading to the emergence of musical meaning.

In the foregoing sections we have attempted to indicate some of Schutz's insights and contributions toward a foundation of a phenomenology of music, as well as carefully developing some of Schutz's work along the lines suggested by him. In this way, we have uncovered a rich and fertile field of ideas and suggestions which would require a fully developed phenomenology of music to complete. Such a development is beyond the scope of the present investigation, however, which only set itself the task of examining Schutz's phenomenological approach to music with an eye towards its concrete contributions. A multiplicity of insights have surfaced in the course of these investigations, and we find ourselves challenged to begin again—this time where Schutz left off.

References and Footnotes

1. Alfred Schutz, "Fragments on the phenomenology of music," ed. Frederick Kersten, in *Music and Man*, v. 2, nos. 1/2 (1976), pp. 5–72. Hereafter cited as FPM.
2. Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*. ed. Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). The essay "Making music together," pp. 159–178, is hereafter cited as MMT.
3. Schutz's discussion of this in "Making music together" seems, in fact, to have been drawn from the earlier investigations in "Fragments."
4. Spiegelberg has referred to this "negative aspect" of the phenomenological method, i.e., "the identification and deliberate elimination of theoretical con-

structs and symbolisms in favor of the unadulterated phenomena . . ." in *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 656.

5. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Dusquesne University Press, 1964), Part I, §1 dealing with the "constancy-hypothesis." It might be parenthetically noted at this point that musical experience has little to do with notes, chords, etc.
6. See Section 9 of this chapter for further discussion of this topic.
7. Schutz writes: "It may be hoped that intensified research into the phenomenology of musical experience will shed some light upon the difficult problem as to which of these means of meaningful arrangement of tones is *essential to music in general*, regardless of what its particular historical setting may be" (MMT 170n: my italics). Also see Husserl's characterization of the phenomenological method as one in search of essentials in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Erstes Buch* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), §75. Hereafter cited as *Ideen I*.
8. Schutz's use of the term "musical meaning," as well as the, in my opinion, rather unfortunate use of "musical thought," must be correctly understood, especially in this context where they are used alongside of "scientific thought." Schutz does not mean to equate musical and scientific meaning: this will become clear when Schutz's objection to Husserl's doctrine of "monothetic constitution" is discussed below. Musical meaning differs from scientific or conceptual meaning in that it does not point beyond itself to something else, and in this connection it is important to note that musical meaning is not to be found in the notes or score. Still, as in the scientific experience, musical experience is "meaningful," i.e., there is some kind of understanding going on that is denoted by the very term "music." Thus, in a very fundamental sense, we must say that music, itself, is the "meaning."

   But beyond this most fundamental statement concerning musical meaning, is the purely phenomenological import that this term has for Schutz, who is dealing with music "as a phenomenon of our conscious life" (FPM §16). That is, through his reflective analysis of the musical experience, attention is focussed upon the field of investigation proper to the phenomenological investigation, i.e., musical consciousness, its essential structure *and its correlate*, or intentional object ("phenomenon"). This correlate of musical consciousness is the "meaning" of which Schutz speaks. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* ed. R. Boehm (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; English trans. J. S. Churchill, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964]), §43, "The perceived is also what is meant; the act of meaning 'lives' in the act of perception." Also *Ideen I*, §90, "Ähnlich wie die Wahrnehmung hat *jedes* intentionale Erlebnis—eben das macht das Grundstück der Intentionalität aus—sein, 'intentionales Objekt,' d.i. seinen gegenständlichen Sinn."
9. For Husserl's explanation of the concept of "foundation" see *Logische Untersuchungen* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), v. 2, Part I, Chapter 2, pp. 261ff. The passage here referred to was paraphrased by Marvin Farber, in *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943), pp. 297–99.

"If in accordance with essential law an a can only exist in a comprehensive unity which connects with a μ, then we say, an a as such needs foundation through a μ, or also, an a as such is in need of completion by means of a μ. If accordingly, a_o, μ_o are definite particular cases of the pure genera a, or μ, which stand in the cited relationship, and if they are members of one whole, then we say that a_o is founded by μ_o . . . The indefinite expressions: a_0 is in need of a supplement, or it is based upon a certain factor, are synonymous with the expression: a_0 is *dependent*."

10. See Husserl, *Ideen* I, §119.
11. ". . . die ihrem Wesen nach 'ursprünglich' nur synthetisch bewusst werden können . . ." (*Ideen I*, §119, p. 294).
12. Also see MMT 172f.
13. Schutz's claim that musical experience offers an example of a polythetic process of constitution which cannot be grasped monothetically, i.e., conceptualized, represents a criticism of Husserl's doctrine of constitution. Husserl maintained that for every polythetic constitution there existed as an "essential" possibility its transformation into a monothetically available objectivity. See *Ideen I*, §119; *Logische Untersuchungen*, Inv. V, §36. Husserl's position insured that all dimensions of consciousness were available for conceptualization. Also cf. MMT 178 for further implications.
14. "Eidetische Singularitäten sind Wesen, die zwar notwendig über sich 'allgemeine' Wesen haben als ihre Gattungen, aber nicht mehr unter sich Besonderungen, in Beziehung auf welche sie selbst Arten (nächste Arten oder mittelbare, höhere Gattungen) wären" (*Ideen I*, §12; also §§15, 75).
15. Insofar as literary criticism and analysis fail to recognize the fundamentally polythetic character of the poetic meaning they obstruct honest attempts to come to an understanding of the original intentions of the poet. Even the best theory or interpretation, can do no more than aid the reader or listener to a more adequate recreation of the polythetically constituted poetical meaning. Similarly, an account of the life of Beethoven etc., can never replace the actual experience of reproducing in some manner the musical development and unfolding of that musical work.
16. It is only within this larger context that Schutz's motives for assigning the essay on music in (Collected Papers) II to "applied theory" make sense. MMT is *first* an investigation of "the social interaction which, though it is an indispensible condition of all possible communication, does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it" (MMT 161). The occasion of making music together is itself only one example of a process fundamental to all forms of communication and thus must be understood in this larger framework.
17. In CP I 208–259. Although published in 1945, on the basis of a manuscript made available to me by Prof. Frederick Kersten, it seems that this essay was written between 1940 and 1943 and thus precedes the "Fragments" essay of 1944. With this in mind I have concluded that the later essay on music can be seen as an attempt by Schutz to study one particular province of meaning in some detail.
18. Schutz considerably broadened Husserl's concept of epoché. For example, even the natural attitude has its peculiar epoché, which itself contributes to the nature of this province of meaning. The epoché of the natural attitude involves

the suspension of all doubts about the existence of the world (CP I 229). The epoché characteristic of the musical experience, according to Schutz, simply involves the suspension of "more layers of the reality of daily life" (CP I 233).

19. The meaning of "finite provinces of *meaning*" is indicated by Schutz's reference in a footnote to "On multiple realities" (CP I 230) to Husserl's *Ideen I*, 55: "Absolute Realität und Welt sind hier eben Titel für gewisse gültige Sinneseinheiten (nämlich Einheiten des 'Sinnes"), bezogen auf gewisse ihrem *Wesen* nach gerade so und nicht anders sinngebende und Sinnesgültigkeit ausweisende Zusammenhänge des absoluten, reinen Bewusstseins." It is in terms of these "unities of meaning" and the "meaning-giving consciousness" that Schutz reinterprets James's "psychologistic" concept. See CP I 229f.
20. See CP I 239, 234f.
21. See "Don Quixote and the problem of reality," CP II 149ff. Here Schutz discusses the problem of the reality of the work of art in connection with Don Quixote's attendance at the puppet show of Master Pedro: "We, the audience, the beholders, are powerless with respect to the reality of the work of art or the theater; as beholders we have to suffer or to enjoy it, but we are not in the position to interfere with it, to change it by our actions. Here is perhaps one of the roots of the particular phenomenological structure of the aesthetic experience. But to follow this idea up would lead too far afield" (150).
22. Alfred Schutz, *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*. ed. Richard M. Zaner (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970). Schutz worked on the unfinished manuscript of this book, according to the editor, from August 1947 to August 1951. Hereafter cited as RPR. See also CP I 227.
23. With respect to that which is thematic for musical consciousness Schutz says, "it is the grasping of the composer's musical thought and its interpretation by re-creation which . . . become 'thematic' for his ongoing activity. This thematic kernel stands out against the horizon of preacquainted knowledge, which knowledge functions as a scheme of reference and interpretation for the grasping of the composer's thought" (MMT 169).
24. Schutz's theory of relevances provides a basis for a more adequate interpretation of the phenomenon of musical "taste." With reference to the stock of knowledge at hand as the sedimentation of relevant previous experiences we can better understand the difficulty encountered in listening to contemporary music, e.g., modern jazz, where previous experience may be unable to offer "types" relevant to such a novel experience.
25. Schutz doesn't explain how this coordination is achieved. It is probable that had Schutz completed the manuscript that he would have included an account of this coordination in section 5 which deals with music and dance.
26. Schutz remains consistent, continually searching for those elements which are essential to the musical experience. One may only question his preference of the term "theme" rather than "rhythm," which he declares is too equivocal (FPM §18). We can agree with Schutz on this point naturally, although the term "theme" is beset by similar difficulties.
27. Schutz's brief discussion of the art of painting is confined to an understanding of a painting as framed and having only one perspective point. This is, however, not the only possibility, since paintings are not always framed and a single perspective can be shattered, for example, by the introduction of other perspectives.

28. See José Ortega y Gasset, *The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture and Literature*. tr. Helene Weyl (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 121.
29. Emphasis should be placed on the word "spatial" here. Although Schutz does not, in this quotation, specify that he is speaking of the absence of spatial structure, I believe that this is what he intended. To be sure, there is structure in the acoustic field, but it is temporal not spatial. For example, if there is depth in acoustic experience then it is the experience of temporal depth, i.e., the past, that is meant.
30. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), §32; see also §§49b, 49c. For Schutz's comments on *Ideen II* see "Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Volume II," in *Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*. ed. I. Schutz (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 15–39.
31. See RPR for a detailed study of the systems of relevances operative in the present and the role which these relevances play in the selection of aspects of the past important for present experience.
32. See "On multiple realities," CP I 212ff.
33. See E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), §§18, 59. Hereafter cited as CM.
34. Cf. CM §38.
35. Schutz's claim that the "passive synthesis" is an "illusion" has radical consequences. Husserl maintained that this synthesis is responsible for the fact that the Ego has a world of objects in the first place (CM §38). This investigation, however, extends beyond the scope of the present investigations.
36. Our earlier clarification of the term "meaning" should be recalled here (see p. 6 above). For Schutz, meaning, "is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness, but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude" (CP I 210).
37. There is some confusion in this essay about the use of the term "communication." Schutz says "The chief interest of our analysis consists in the particular character of all social interactions connected with the musical process . . . founded upon communication, but not primarily upon a semantic system . . ." (MMT 159). Schutz also says that "all communication presupposes the existence of some kind of social interaction" (MMT 161). Clearly, Schutz refers to communication in two different senses in these quotations. In the first, communication is understood as the "pre-communicative social relationship," and in the second it is a semantic system. There is no real contradiction between these statements, but the reader must be careful as to which of these senses is given to the term when it is used.
38. See "The dimensions of the social world," CP II 24ff.
39. Work has also been done in this field by others. See Ernest Ansermet, *Les Fondements de la Musique dans la Conscience Humaine* (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1961); Roman Ingarden, *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst: Musikwerk, Bild, Architektur, Film* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962). [Editor's note: See also the extensive work done by J. Arcaya, T. Clifton, and F.J. Smith,

In Search of Musical Method (1976), *The Experiencing of Musical Sound* (1978), and *Understanding the Musical Experience*, 1989.

40. See "On multiple realities" (CP I 207–259) for Schutz's discussion of various provinces of meaning and their relationship to one another.

A phenomenological interpretation of the works of Arnold Schoenberg

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ARNOLD SCHOENBERG always denied that his "method of composition with twelve notes posited only in relation with each other" could ever qualify as some sort of "system." The word, system, suggests the notion of a binding prescription of a normative order. And it was precisely this that the composer held to be quite alien to his way of doing things musically.† In an unpublished writing entitled *Wgr* (apparently *Wiesengrund*) Schoenberg recalls to mind, that the twelve tone method "does not represent the only way to the solution of new problems but is only one of such possibilities."[1] It is not legitimate to impose on compositional practice an external legality; and thus it is not possible to indicate in any codified system the path of artistic production.

In his *Harmonielehre* (1911), written before the new method took shape, one finds an analogous achievement in regard to the relationship between compositional procedures and theory. Musical theory "observes a series of phenomena, classifies them according to certain common features and from these deduces laws. This is entirely appropriate and could hardly be otherwise, since there is no other realistic road open. But at this very point there is likewise the beginning of error, because the false conclusion is drawn that these laws – from the moment they seem to be

† Accordingly, Schoenberg's disagreement with Hauer had its origin in the purely methodological character of his new compositional model. In this context we have to understand his polemics with the author of *Dr. Faustus*, as also with the "secret *consigliere*" of Mann. This is so also with Adorno, with whom he disputed the interpretation of the serial principle as a binding order.